Will It Happen Again - FAA\u27s Disastrous Prior Experience with User Fees by Goldberg, Roy
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 71 | Issue 1 Article 3
2006
Will It Happen Again - FAA's Disastrous Prior
Experience with User Fees
Roy Goldberg
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roy Goldberg, Will It Happen Again - FAA's Disastrous Prior Experience with User Fees, 71 J. Air L. & Com. 37 (2006)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol71/iss1/3
WILL IT HAPPEN AGAIN?-FAA'S DISASTROUS PRIOR
EXPERIENCE WITH USER FEES
Roy GOLDBERG, ESQ.*
I. INTRODUCTION
S EEKING TO PREVENT a looming fiscal crisis, the Federal
Aviation Administration ("FAA") is giving serious considera-
tion to converting to a user fee system to fund its air traffic con-
trol ("ATC") operations. These fees, which would be imposed
directly on air carriers on a per-movement basis, would replace
the long-utilized "Aviation Trust Fund," comprised of taxes on
domestic and international tickets and congressional appropria-
tions. The FAA claims that its new "funding mechanism ...
should tie revenues raised for the system to the infrastructure
and operational costs of the system."' In November 2005, the
FAA Administrator emphasized the imminent need for the FAA
to convert to "a constant, stable revenue stream that's related to
the actual cost of services we provide."2
* Partner, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP. Through his
representation of the Air Transport Association of Canada, the author helped to
lead the coalitions of international air carriers which on three separate occasions
over the course of eight years succeeded in striking down the FAA's overflight
user fees. The author wishes to acknowledge his mentor in that effort, Robert
Kneisley, lead counsel and architect of the initial litigation over the fees. Mr.
Kneisley is now Associate General Counsel for Southwest Airlines.
I Aviation Financing Reauthorization, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,100 (proposed Sept. 13,
2005); see also Marion C. Blakey, Administrator, FAA, 'You Need to Weigh In,"
Speech before the Trust Fund Forum (April 25, 2005), available, at http://
ww.fed.gov/ news/speeches/speeches/blakey/2005/speeches-blakey-050425.
htm ("Tying fees to the cost of providing service will serve to protect both the
FAA and its customers."); "Trust Fund Taxes Set to Expire in 2007," FAA 2005, at
4, available at http:www.fed.gov/news/testimony/testimony/2005/trust funds.
pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006) ("FAA needs a consistent, stable revenue stream
that is not tied to the price of an airline ticket but rather reflects our actual cost
to provide service.").
2 Marion C. Blakey, Administrator, FAA, A Sense of History, Speech at the
Aero Club of Washington (Nov. 28, 2005).
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This would not be the agency's first experience with attempt-
ing to raise revenue via user fees. In 1997 the FAA started to
impose user fees for air traffic control services provided to "over-
flights," i.e., flights that travel through U.S.-controlled airspace,
but neither take off nor land in the United States. Overflights
are typically operated by foreign airlines, with Canadian carriers
accounting for about half and a mix of carriers from Europe,
Asia and Latin America making up the balance. Overall, over-
flights account for less than two percent of all FAA-controlled
flight operations.
The FAA's experience with overflight user fees was an unmiti-
gated disaster. On three separate occasions over the course of
eight years, from 1997 to 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit struck down the FAA's overflight fees because they
did not comply with the statutory mandate that the fees must be
directly related to the FAA's costs of providing the services ren-
dered.' As a result, the FAA was forced to refund or forego col-
lection of hundreds of millions of dollars in fees over those
eight years.
How did this happen? In its single-minded pursuit of addi-
tional revenue, the FAA repeatedly failed to ensure that its fee
methodology reflected the agency's actual costs of providing ser-
vices to overflights. The agency clung stubbornly to unsupport-
able positions adopted without empirical evidence and prior to
inviting industry comments. This was followed by sham "public
meetings" in which panels of stone-faced FAA officials refused to
respond to a litany of industry presentations that expressly de-
tailed why the fees were unlawful.
Even worse, rather than learning from the adverse court deci-
sions regarding how the fees should be modified to meet the
statutory criteria, the FAA repeatedly went to Congress in search
of legislative "fixes" to weaken the requirement that the fees be
strictly cost-based, and even to bar affected carriers from seeking
judicial review of the fees. From the FAA's perspective, all of its
actions were beyond reproach; its only "problem" was the over-
sight of the courts and their power to require the FAA to strictly
adhere to the law.
3Asiana Airlines v. FAA, 134 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Air Transp. Ass'n of
Can. v. FAA, 254 F.3d 271, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter ATAC I], modified,
276 F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Air Transp. Ass'n of Can. v. FAA, 323 F.3d 1093
(D.C. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter ATAC II].
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None of this bodes well for the FAA's conversion of its entire
funding structure to a user fee system, particularly considering
that foreign overflights account for such a small amount of the
FAA's air traffic control activity. What is to constrain the FAA
from once again ignoring industry comments and adopting fees
that are not tied to its actual costs to provide the services ren-
dered? A repeat of the overflight user fee fiasco on a much
wider scale could easily wreak fiscal havoc on airlines. Extreme
vigilance by the aviation community before Congress, the FAA
and, if necessary, the courts, is essential to safeguard the indus-
try from a recurrence of the overflight fee disaster.
A. OVERFLIGHTS
An "overflight" occurs when an aircraft enters U.S.-controlled
airspace, but does not take off or land in the United States. For
example, a flight from Toronto to Mexico City will enter air-
space that is controlled by FAA personnel, even though it never
touches the ground in the United States. "Enroute" operations
are when the aircraft flies over the land that consists of the
United States; "oceanic" operations are those where the aircraft
flies in airspace over oceans that are controlled by the United
States. The U.S. controls large swaths of oceanic airspace, such
that aircraft which do not come within thousands of miles of the
United States may still be subject to FAA overflight fees.
B. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR OVERFLIGHT USER
FEES
In October 1996, Congress enacted section 273 of the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996.' The Act for the first time
authorized the FAA to impose a user fee in connection with the
provision of air traffic control services. The FAA was directed to
establish a fee schedule and collection process to cover "[a]ir
traffic control and related services provided to aircraft other
than military and civilian aircraft of the United States govern-
ment or of a foreign government that neither take off from, nor
land in, the United States."5
The intent of the Act was to enable the agency to establish a
predictable and reliable revenue stream to compensate the
agency for the costs of providing air traffic control services to
4 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat.
3213 (1996).
5 49 U.S.C. § 45301(a) (1) (1996).
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overflights. As it turned out, that goal was not achieved for the
next eight years due to the FAA's critical miscalculations and its
systematic failure to correct them.
The FAA's most fundamental error was a failure to under-
stand that the 1996 Act authorized a strictly cost-based fee, not an
unconstrained tax, on overflights. Thus, the statute required
the FAA to "ensure that each of the fees . . . [was] directly re-
lated to the Administration's costs . . .of providing the service
rendered."6 Covered services "include [d] the costs of air traffic
control, navigation, weather services, training and emergency
services which are available to facilitate safe transportation over
the United States, and other services provided by the Adminis-
trator or by programs financed by the Administrator to flights
that neither take off nor land in the United States."7
Optimistically (as it turned out), the statute authorized the
FAA to recover up to $100 million annually from the fees.' Fi-
nally, the statute instructed the FAA to "publish in the Federal
Register an initial fee schedule and associated collection process
as an interim final rule, pursuant to which public comment will
be sought and a final rule issued."9
II. STRIKE ONE: THE FAA'S 1997 UNSUCCESSFUL
OVERFLIGHT USER FEES
In March 1997 the FAA issued an "initial interim final rule"
establishing a fee schedule and collection process for over-
flights, with an effective date sixty days later.'0 The overflight
fees were computed based on distance flown through U.S.-con-
trolled airspace." Separate computations were made for ser-
vices provided in enroute and oceanic airspace in order to
reflect the FAA's different costs of providing services in each of
those environments.' 2 Carriers were required to pay a per-100-
nautical mile fee of $78.90 for enroute operations and $69.50
for oceanic flights.' 3 It was probably no coincidence that the
6 49 U.S.C. § 45301 (b) (1) (B).
7 49 U.S.C. § 45301 (b) (1)(B).
8 49 U.S.C. § 45301 (b) (1)(A).
9 49 U.S.C. § 45301 (b) (2).
10 Fees for Air Traffic Services for Certain Flight Through U.S.-Controlled Air-
space, 62 Fed. Reg. 13,496 (proposed Mar. 20, 1997).




FAA estimated the expected revenue would be approximately
equal to the statutory maximum of $100 million annually.
The FAA's fees were based almost exclusively upon a single
study prepared by a private consultant, GRA, Inc., entitled
"Analysis of Overflights: Costs and Pricing."" The FAA ex-
plained that services provided to overflights required both (1)
incremental expenditures, which increase with the quantity of
services provided, and (2) fixed and common expenditures for
facilities and other expenses, which cannot be attributed to par-
ticular flights or classes of flights. 15 The GRA study allocated
fixed costs among all classes of users using "Ramsey pricing"
methodology. This methodology distributes costs among classes
of users based on the elasticity of their demand for services, in
an effort to minimize the effect of the regulation on the behav-
ior of users. Thus, under this method of allocating fixed costs,
users that are less sensitive to changes in price are allocated a
relatively greater share of fixed and common costs.
The FAA did not invite industry comments on the fees before
they were scheduled to go into effect and refused industry re-
quests to postpone their effectiveness until after the FAA re-
sponded to public comments. Nevertheless, the Air Transport
Association of Canada ("ATAC") filed objections with the FAA
that the fees were impermissibly based on the "value" to the
user, rather than the FAA's cost of providing the services ren-
dered, and thus resembled a tax more than a cost-based fee.
The FAA ignored this objection as well as numerous other
criticisms submitted by a large number of international air carri-
ers and organizations. Similarly, the FAA held a "public meet-
ing" during which industry representatives were permitted to
make presentations critical of the fees, but the FAA officials in
attendance refused to defend the fees or even to engage in dis-
course with the speakers. It was truly a sham proceeding.
Given the FAA's complete unwillingness to engage in any
kind of meaningful dialogue with affected carriers about the
new fees and its unusual methodology to calculate them, litiga-
tion appeared inevitable. The airlines believed that the FAA's
fees were far in excess of the FAA's costs of providing ATC ser-
vices to overflights, and they had reason to know, for they had a
great deal of experience dealing with similar fees charged by
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dian government had radically revamped its system for aviation
funding by creating a new charging authority (NAV Canada) to
impose user fees on air carriers for their use of ATC services.
Based on that experience, ATAC believed that the FAA's fees
were nearly triple what they should have been-i.e. that the
FAA's total annual costs of overflight services were closer to $35
million than the $100 million sought by the FAA.
But ATAC and the other international carriers did not seek
litigation. In fact, they took extraordinary steps to avoid it.
Before the new fees became effective, ATAC sought a meeting
directly with senior policy officials of both the Department of
Transportation ("DOT") and FAA. At that meeting, ATAC ex-
plained that it had no objection to the principle of FAA charg-
ing fees to recover its costs; rather, the question was the proper
level of such fees. ATAC drew on the Canadian experience,
pointing out that NAV Canada had engaged in an intensive,
nearly two-year period of fact-finding, dialogue, and negotiation
with users before setting its ATC fees. ATAC explained that
such a lengthy period was necessary given the complexity of is-
sues and data involved, as well as the fact that the process was
radically new to both the government and the airlines - the
same conditions facing the FAA. The Canadian negotiations be-
tween the parties emphasized inclusion of stakeholders and
were characterized by transparency of data. As a result, when
NAV Canada finally imposed its fees, no litigation occurred.
ATAC urged the DOT and the FAA to heed the Canadian ex-
perience by establishing a full and open dialogue with the user
community, making its cost data transparent to the public, and
only then determining the appropriate fee levels. The senior
officials of both the DOT and the FAA summarily rejected these
pleas. They claimed there was no need for prior-notice-and-
comment rulemaking, and that the FAA was simply following
Congress' direction to proceed with an interim final rule
("IFR"). When ATAC pointed out that the statute in no way pre-
cluded the FAA from consulting with affected parties before is-
suing an IFR and that the FAA would likely reach a more
informed and less controversial decision by doing so, the senior
policy officials simply demurred. As the DOT's then general
counsel put it, "Congress wants us to collect these fees," as
though that were a complete answer to all criticisms of the fees.
As the FAA summarily rejected all efforts by affected parties to
engage in dialogue before the fees were imposed, ATAC and
several foreign airlines filed petitions for review of the overflight
2006] FAA USER FEES 43
fees with the D.C. Circuit. Although the court declined the car-
riers' request to stay the fees' effectiveness, it did render a deci-
sion on the merits quickly. In January 1998 the D.C. Circuit
issued the first of several decisions striking down the FAA's
fees. '6
In granting the petitions, the court held that "insofar as the
FAA allocated fixed and common costs using the Ramsey pric-
ing methodology, its fee structure impermissibly included a
component based on value to the user."' 7 The court explained
that the "[s]tatutory language requiring that 'each' fee be 'di-
rectly related to ... the costs of providing the service rendered'
expresse [d] a clear congressional intent that fees must be estab-
lished in such a way that each flight pays according to the bur-
den associated with servicing that flight."'" There "may be
methods to reasonably determine an appropriate fraction of the
FAA's fixed costs to assign to each overflight, and if the FAA
does not have enough information to precisely determine the
burdens imposed by individual flights, it may proceed based on
the best data available."'" "However, [the FAA] may not set fees
on a basis other than cost. In this case it attempted to do so
when it apportioned its costs among user groups based on each
group's relative sensitivity to the amount charged."2" '
The court acknowledged the FAA's assertion that Ramsey
pricing was not used to establish costs based on the value of such
costs to users, but rather to apportion those costs, but explained:
This distinction drawn by the FAA illuminates the very pit into
which it has fallen: although it is true that the total cost figure is
based on real cost data and not on a "market price" for services,
the fact is that the FAA has distributed those costs among all
users of the system based on the value of services as perceived by
each group of users. "The problem arises because the FAA
chooses to understand 'costs' at too high a level of generality."'"
Because the court found no way to "circumscribe a compo-
nent of the fees based entirely on direct costs of services," it va-
cated the FAA's "fee schedule in its entirety. '"22 As a result, the
FAA was required to refund all of the fees it had collected to
16 Asiana, 134 F.3d 398.
17 Id. at 401.
18 Id. at 402.
19 Id. at 402-03.
20 Id. at 403.
21 Id. at 402.
22 Id. at 403.
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that point, nearly fifty-million dollars. The FAA also was pre-
cluded from continuing to impose any user fee on overflights
until a new rule could be issued.
The FAA's adoption of a fee based on value rather than cost
was especially ironic given its express acknowledgement that the
fees could not be based on the weight of the aircraft because
"the use of weight when viewed as a measure of value of the ser-
vice to the user is not consistent with the FAA's current author-
ity."23 Thus, although the FAA was well aware that its fees could
not be based on value to the user, it nevertheless attempted to
impose fees that were in fact based on the value to the user.
In subsequently granting ATAC's request for attorneys' fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA")24 , the court ad-
monished the FAA for attempting to "completely displace Con-
gress" in its setting of the fees.25 The court found that the FAA
could not even satisfy the modest EAJA requirement that its liti-
gation position have been "substantially justified" on the law and
the facts:
[The FAA] insists that because the total price structure was de-
signed to recover the Administration's costs, that meant that the
scheme complied with the statutory requirement that 'each of
the fees' be 'directly related' to the cost of providing the service
rendered. All that the [FAA's] reasoning can establish is that the
totality of the fees charged all users is ultimately related to the
cost of providing all services. We cannot hold that an attempt by
an agency to completely displace Congress is substantially
justified.26
III. STRIKE TWO: FAA'S 2000 UNSUCCESSFUL
OVERFLIGHT USER FEES
Given the humiliation that the FAA suffered before the court
with its initial overflight fees, the international carriers had rea-
son for optimism that the agency would do whatever was neces-
sary to prevent a repeat performance. They believed that the
FAA most certainly would involve the users in meaningful dis-
cussions before adopting a methodology for new overflight fees,
and that the agency would take other steps to ensure that there
23 Fees for Air Traffic Services for Certain Flights through U.S.-Controlled Air-
space, 62 Fed. Reg. 13,496 (Mar. 20, 1997) (emphasis added).
24 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000).
25 Air Transp. Ass'n of Can. v. FAA, 156 F.3d 1329, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
26 Id. (emphasis in original).
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would be no legitimate objections to the fees. Unfortunately,
these expectations were dashed by the FAA. Although the FAA's
new fees were less than half the level of the initial fees, the
agency refused to make its cost data transparent to users, its fee-
setting methodology was suspect from the outset, and the FAA
again refused to consult with affected parties before making the
fees effective.
In June 2000 - approximately two and one-half years after the
court vacated the initial overflight user fees - the FAA issued a
second IFR for overflight fees. The new fees were in the per-100
nautical mile amount of $37.43 for enroute and $20.16 for
oceanic.- 7 The "user fee [was] expected to generate approxi-
mately $39.6 million in billings during the first 12 months. '2 8
The fees were developed without industry input and were sched-
uled to go into effect before comments were received.
The report which accompanied the new IFR explained that
the fee development process involved four steps:
(1) determining FAA's full costs of providing both enroute
and oceanic air traffic control services to all flights - that
is, overflights and non-overflights;
(2) determining which of the costs identified in step one met
the requirement of being "directly related" to the services
rendered by the FAA;
(3) determining, based on the costs computed in step two,
unit costs for providing enroute and oceanic air traffic
control services to overflights; and
(4) establishing overflight fees that cover air traffic control
service costs as well as billing and collection costs. 9
"To compute the 'unit costs' (step three), the FAA divided the
'directly related' costs identified in step two by the total number
of miles flown by all aircraft using the same enroute airspace
and oceanic airspace, respectively." The FAA stated:
Because the level of [air traffic control] services are [sic] as-
sumed identical for all aircraft operations within a particular en-
vironment (i.e., enroute or oceanic), it is reasonable to assume
that the costs of providing [air traffic control] services to over-
flights .. .within each environment is [sic] identical to the unit
27 Fees for FAA Services for Certain Flights, 65 Fed. Reg. 36,002 (June 6, 2000).
28 Id.
2 ATAC I, 254 F.3d at 276.
- Id.
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costs of providing [air traffic control] services to all air traffic
within each environment. 31
As before, ATAC and other affected parties filed objections to
the fees before they became effective. As before, the agency ig-
nored them. ATAC pointed out, among other things, that over-
flights are different than non-overflights because the former fly
in higher altitudes and do not require air traffic control assis-
tance to ascend or descend either to airports or to lower alti-
tudes surrounding airports.3 2 Thus, they require relatively little
in the way of ATC services compared to non-overflights, which
must move through lower altitudes.3
The agency again summarily rejected all criticisms of the fees.
And again the FAA convened a "public meeting" at which stone-
faced officials yet again refused to defend the fees or engage in
any dialogue with the many industry representatives who
presented detailed objections.
As had occurred three years earlier, ATAC and other parties
tried to avoid litigation by meeting with senior DOT and FAA
officials before the fees became effective. The carriers cau-
tioned the FAA against repeating its previous mistake and urged
the agency to involve users in the fee-setting process before im-
posing new fees, either via a notice-and-comment rulemaking or
an informal consultation. They stressed that while prior consul-
tation with users would marginally delay the collection of new
fee revenue, it would ultimately work to the government's ad-
vantage by ensuring that the new fees would be much less likely
to be challenged. But as had occurred three years earlier, the
senior government officials summarily rejected these pleas.
They asserted that the FAA had the authority to impose new fees
via an IFR and there was simply no reason to slow down the
process. They also boasted that carriers would have no valid ba-
sis for objecting to the FAA's new fee-setting methodology.
31 Id.
32 When aircraft are taking off from a major U.S. airport, they are controlled
by FAA personnel within the tower at the airport. However, shortly after taking
off, aircraft are handed off to controllers at one of several enroute air route cen-
ters or oceanic centers the FAA operates to handle aircraft coming from and to a
variety of U.S. airports, as well as overflights.
33 Even the traveler who casually listens to cockpit-to-controller transmissions
(e.g., Channel 9 on United Airlines domestic flights) can appreciate that an air-
craft that has just left the airport terminal controller environment and is in the
process of climbing to the higher altitudes engages in more frequent contacts
with air traffic controllers during that transitional process than once the aircraft
is closer to its cruising altitude.
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Clearly, the government had learned no lessons from its prior
debacle.
As all efforts to engage the FAA in a meaningful dialogue
were resoundingly rejected, a coalition of foreign parties again
challenged the FAA's fees in the D.C. Circuit. Again, the court
struck down the fees. In a July 2001 decision, the D.C. Circuit
found that the FAA had presented "no record support" for its
assumption "that the FAA incurs the same costs in providing ser-
vice to overflights and nonoverflights using either the enroute
airspace or the oceanic airspace." 4 The court stated that "[t]o
survive arbitrary and capricious review, the 2000 Rule must con-
tain a 'satisfactory explanation' for the FAA's conclusion that
the overflight fees imposed are 'directly related' to the FAA's
cost of providing service to overflights," and that "[i]n view of
the methodology followed by the FAA in establishing the fees,
there must be at least record support for the proposition that the
FAA incurs the same costs in providing service to overflights and
nonoverflights using either the enroute airspace or the oceanic
airspace. ''"5 "Because the FAA ... failed to articulate the basis
for its conclusion that 'the unit costs of providing [air traffic
control] services to overflights within each environment is [sic]
identical to the unit costs of providing [air traffic control] ser-
vices to all air traffic within each environment," the court va-
cated the 2000 IFR.3 6
IV. STRIKE THREE: FAA'S 2001 UNSUCCESSFUL
OVERFLIGHT USER FEES
On August 20, 2001-approximately five weeks after the court
struck down the FAA's second IFR for overflight user fees-the
FAA issued a "Final Rule" for overflight fees. 7 The Final Rule
was essentially identical to the 2000 IFR that the court had just
vacated, but contained a more elaborate justification. Signifi-
cantly, the agency retained the judicially discredited assumption
that it incurs virtually identical per-mile costs in servicing both
overflights and non-overflights within each ATC environment.
The agency also took the position that because it had issued a
Final Rule, the recent court decision vacating the second in-
'4 ATAC 1, 254 F.3d at 278.
35 Id. at 278 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
~" Id.
37 Fees for FAA Services for Certain Flights, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,680 (Aug. 20,
2001).
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terim rule should be nullified, at least until the court had an
opportunity to decide whether the Final Rule cured the defects
identified by the court. Thus the FAA petitioned the court for
rehearing, requesting that the IFR be remanded without vacatur
so that the FAA would not be required to refund fees collected
to date if the court ultimately were to conclude that the Final
Rule provided the IFR's missing "record support" for the identi-
cal cost assumption.
Significantly, the FAA promised to refund all fees collected
under both the IFR and the Final Rule if the court were to "find
that the FAA's methodology departs from the statutory stan-
dard . ".. ."' In December 2001, the court granted the FAA's
petition for rehearing,3 9 and thereby tied the fate of the fees
collected under the second interim rule to the Final Rule.
In comments on the 2000 IFR, affected carriers reiterated
their prior objections that the FAA's costs of providing ATC ser-
vices to overflights were substantially lower than for non-over-
flights, and submitted supporting declarations by two former
FAA air traffic control experts, with several decades of years of
combined experience in enroute and oceanic sectors. These ex-
perts contended that (1) traffic controller costs are not "fixed,"
because the FAA varies the number of controllers on duty 'de-
pending on the volume of aircraft operating within the particu-
lar geographical area or sector'; (2) flights in the "high-altitude"
sector (18,000 feet and above) require far less controller atten-
tion per mile than flights in the "low-altitude" sector; (3) over-
flights occur more exclusively in the high-altitude sector; and
(4) by virtue of these differences and FAA practices, there are
means to allocate controller time between overflights and non-
overflights. 40
The 2001 Final Rule provided four arguments in response to
these criticisms:
1. The agency incurs the "vast majority of costs by making its
comprehensive [air traffic control system available to all
flights (regardless of the type of aircraft.. .) ";
2. The FAA's "marginal cost, including labor cost, for pro-
viding services to any flight is close to zero";
38 Petition for Rehearing at 4, 14, Air Transp. Ass'n of Can. v. FAA, 276 F.3d
599 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-1334).
39 Air Transp. Ass'n of Can. v. FAA, 276 F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
40 Fees for FAA Services for Certain Flights, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,680 (Aug. 20,
2001).
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3. "[T]he majority of FAA's costs are common and fixed
costs"; and
4. The controllers' responsibilities "for Overflights are not
fundamentally any different than for non-Overflights."'"
A. BEFORE THE COURT'S DECISION FAA SEEKS A LEGISLATIVE
Fix
Frustrated by its most recent judicial defeat, the FAA decided
to try to seek relief in Congress. The agency succeeded in get-
ting language added to the post-9/11 Aviation and Transporta-
tion Security Act of 2001,42 ("ATSA") that the FAA believed
would make it easier for the agency to prevail in court. This new
language replaced the requirement in the 1996 Act that the fees
be "directly related" to the FAA's costs of the services rendered
with a requirement that the fees be "reasonably related" to such
costs.4 3 In addition, the new law provided that "The Determina-
tion of such costs by the Administrator is not subject to judicial
review.""
These significant statutory changes were adopted without
hearings or any other legislative history; they simply appeared in
the final version of the bill. The FAA obviously hoped that these
changes in the governing statute would save it from further judi-
cial embarrassment. As it turned out, the FAA's hopes were
unfulfilled.
B. THE APRIL 2003 DECISION STRIKING DOWN THE FINAL RULE
In April 2003, the court struck down the FAA's Final Rule for
overflight user fees:
For the third time, we must review the lawfulness of a Federal
Aviation Administration regulation establishing fees for air traffic
control services for "overflights".... For the third time, we find
that the FAA disregarded its statutory mandate.45
The court found that the petitioners' experts had made "a
substantial case refuting the agency's unexplicated insistence
that miles of overflights and non-overflights in the Enroute and
Oceanic airspaces are approximately equivalent in their per-
41 Id.
42 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001).
43 Id. § 119(d).
44 Id.
45 ATAC I, 323 F.3d at 1094.
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mile generation of costs. '"46 In a particularly humiliating pas-
sage, the court observed that:
In response the agency offers what amounts to little more than
conclusory denials.
Although consideration of the agency's specific arguments
may seem like flogging a dead horse, we proceed with the exer-
cise so that it may be assured that we have scrutinized its
arguments.
47
The court acknowledged the FAA's assertion that some over-
flights spend some time at low altitudes, but pointed out that this
did "not undermine petitioners' claim that they fly predomi-
nately in the high altitude sector, to a degree far greater than do
non-overflights. ' 48 The court also rejected the FAA's contention
that fixed and common costs dominate, and therefore any dif-
ference in the marginal cost of servicing an additional overflight
versus an additional non-overflight is immaterial.49 The court
emphasized the petitioners' evidence that overflights occur al-
most exclusively in the high-altitude range, that the FAA makes
separate assignments of controllers for that sector, and that the
FAA's per-mile aircraft servicing costs are systematically lower in
the high-altitude range.5 °
In addition, the court dismissed the FAA's argument that its
attempted legislative fix-section 119 of ATSA-applied to the
case at hand so as to deprive the court of jurisdiction to review
the FAA's cost determination. 51 The court noted that ATSA's
"savings clause"-section 141 (d)-provided: "This Act shall not
affect suits commenced before the date of the enactment of this
Act . . . . In all such suits, proceedings shall be had, appeals
taken, and judgments rendered in the same manner and with
the same effect as if this Act had not been enacted. '52 The court
found that this clear language rendered the November 2001
changes to the overflight fee statute inapplicable to the present
case, which was already underway when ATSA was enacted.
The court also rejected the FAA's "exceptionally lame reliance
46 Id. at 1096.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1097.
49 Id.
50 Id.




on legislative history" to argue that ATSA's savings clause did
not apply to the challenge to the overflight fees.54
C. THE FAA RENEGES ON ITS COMMITMENT To REFUND THE
INVALIDED FEES, AND INSTEAD SEEKS YET ANOTHER
LEGISLATIVE Fix
Having been set aside by the court, the FAA's 2001 Final Rule
was void of any legal authority. At that point the FAA should
have refunded all of the fees collected since June 2000, as had
occurred after the Court vacated its first overflight fee rule. In-
deed, in seeking and obtaining rehearing of the July 2001 deci-
sion vacating the 2000 IFR, the FAA had promised that if the
Final Rule were struck down, it would refund all fees collected
since 2000, under both rules. 5 However, the FAA ultimately re-
neged on this express commitment.
In May 2003, the FAA petitioned for rehearing of the court's
decision striking down the 2001 Final Rule.56 The FAA claimed
that based on the language of the decision, it should only be
required to refund that portion of the approximately seventy-
five million dollars in collected fees reflecting certain air traffic
controller labor costs, which the court found to be unsupported
by the administrative record.57 The FAA claimed it was under
no obligation to return fees "calculated independently of that
error."58 The court denied the agency's petition in July 2003. 51
But the agency was still not finished trying to avoid the results of
its loss in court.
For several months during 2003, the agency lobbied Congress
for yet another legislative fix to nullify the latest unfavorable
court ruling. To buy more time for these efforts, the FAA pre-
vailed on the U.S. Solicitor General to seek a series of extensions
of the deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the
U.S. Supreme Court. In October 2003, the Supreme Court de-
nied further extensions of time, and the Solicitor General did
not file certiorari. But the delay allowed the FAA to get what it
wanted from Congress.
54 Id.
55 Petition for Rehearing at 4, Air Transp. Ass'n of Can. v. FAA, 276 F.3d 599
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-1334).
56 Petition for Rehearing, Air Transp. Ass'n of Can. v. FAA, 323 F.3d 193 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (No. 01-1446).
57 Id. at 2.
58 Id.
59 ATAC II, 323 F.3d 1093 (petition for rehearing denied July 3, 2003).
2006]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
In December 2003, at the FAA's urging, Congress enacted leg-
islation that the FAA hoped would retroactively nullify the
court's April 2003 decision to vacate the Final Rule.60 The
FAA's language was a true "political fix" inserted into an omni-
bus FAA authorizing bill with no hearings or discussion. It
sought to replace the judicial function with legislative fiat:
The interim final rule and final rule referred to in subsection
(a), including the fees issued pursuant to those rules, are
adopted, legalized, and confirmed as fully to all intents and pur-
poses as if the same had, by prior Act of Congress, been specifi-
cally adopted, authorized, and directed as of the date those rules
were originally issued. 6
In addition, to avoid application of the ATSA "savings clause"
that had undermined the FAA's earlier attempted legislative fix,
the new statute purported to make the November 2001 "fix" ap-
plicable to the FAA's current fees:
Notwithstanding section 141 (d) (1) of the Aviation and Transpor-
tation Security Act [the amendments to the 1996 Act for over-
flight fees are] deemed to apply to and to have effect with respect
to the authority of the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration with respect to the interim final rule and final rule,
relating to overflight fees, issued by the Administrator on May 30,
2000, and August 13, 2001, respectively.6 2
In response to requests for refunds of the invalidated fees, the
FAA instead issued a notice requesting comments on the new
legislative language in section 229 of Vision 100. The FAA char-
acterized the effect of the new law as follows:
Although the courts have vacated the rules adopted by the FAA
to implement [the Act], Congress has enacted recently Vision
100 - Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act . . . that legisla-
tively adopts the FAA rules, as well as the fees established by
those rules, as of the date of their original issuance.63
The FAA's attempt to "fix" the unfavorable April 2003 court
decision with retroactive statutory amendments was irresponsi-
ble in the extreme. Not only was it unfair to the airlines that
had proven the fees to be unlawful, but it also improperly at-




63 Notice of FAA Final Order Directing the Disposition of Certain Overflight
Fees Collected by the FAA, 69 Fed. Reg. 47,201 (Aug. 4, 2004).
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tempted to remove the check and balance of judicial oversight
from the FAA going forward. While this may have advanced the
FAA's short-term goals, it set a terrible precedent. Allowing the
government to impose millions of dollars in fees without afford-
ing affected parties a meaningful right of judicial review is
neither democratic nor consistent with due process. Nor is it
something that U.S. airlines would want to have visited upon
them by foreign providers of air traffic control services. The
"ends" of the FAA - to raise revenues and avoid further court
defeats - in no way justify the means that the agency pro-
pounded and Congress enabled.
In August 2004, approximately eight months after the enact-
ment of section 229, the FAA issued a notice announcing the
agency's decision to refund all fees it had collected from all car-
riers prior to November 19, 2001 (the date of its earlier at-
tempted legislative fix, section 119 of ATSA).64 In addition,
pursuant to a settlement reached between the FAA and the par-
ties that had successfully challenged the 2000 IFR and the 2001
Final Rule, the FAA agreed to "make payments to the litigating
[carriers] from previously collected fees" based on a formula
agreed to by the parties "in addition to whatever refunds and
credits" were otherwise available to the litigating carriers. G5
Following the settlement, the FAA resumed assessment and
collection of overflight fees based on the methodology of the
(now Congressionally approved) Final Rule. However, as part of
the settlement with the litigating carriers, the FAA agreed to
convene an Aviation Rulemaking Committee ("ARC") consisting
of the FAA and industry representatives to examine, in-depth,
the FAA's methodology for overflight fees and to recommend
whether it should be modified. 66 The ARC process is continu-
ing. The manner is which the FAA handles the ARC will provide
an important clue whether the agency has finally learned from
its mistakes in this litigation and will now engage in a meaning-
ful dialogue with the industry in setting fees. However, the pres-
ence of the statutory limitation on judicial review that the FAA
succeeded in obtaining from Congress casts a dark cloud over
this process. It would ill-serve both the government and indus-
try if the FAA were to succumb to the temptation of this provi-
64 Id.
65 Id.
6 Notice of the Federal Aviation Administration Overflight Fee Aviation
Rulemaking Committee Charter, 69 Fed. Reg. 47,203 (Aug. 4, 2004).
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sion to avoid its continuing obligation to set cost-recovery fees
rather than impose an unconstrained tax on captive users.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the eight-year course of this litigation, the FAA was re-
buked by the Court of Appeals in four separate decisions and
never did manage to produce fees that complied with the law's
cost-recovery standard in the eyes of the court. This is an aston-
ishingly dismal record considering the wide degree of deference
that the courts traditionally give federal agencies in matters
within their expertise. In this case, however, the only reason the
FAA was able to finally succeed in imposing overflight fees was
not because of its technical expertise, but rather its raw political
power (coupled with the foreign carriers' lack thereof).
The FAA's conduct in response to its serial court defeats was
disgraceful. Rather than engage in consultations with users,
make its decision-making process transparent, and strive for a
consensual outcome - which would have eliminated almost any
possibility of litigation - the FAA repeatedly dug in its heels and
looked to Congress for protection. And, when its effort to
weaken the statute to ensure a government court victory failed
to succeed, the FAA took even more extreme measures, per-
suading Congress to codify the fees in law and hamper future
judicial oversight.
This experience raises serious questions about the FAA's abil-
ity to convert virtually its entire budget to a user fee system. Af-
ter all, one may legitimately ask, if the FAA cannot properly
construct user fees for an activity of less than fifty-million dollars,
how can it be relied on to construct user fees to raise for fourteen-
billion dollars7 or more?
There are nevertheless some hopeful signs. Administrator
Blakey and her senior advisors should be given credit for finally
ending the vexatious overflight litigation that they inherited
from previous Administrations.68 At this early stage in the pro-
cess, the FAA appears to be proceeding cautiously and respon-
sibly in the all-important debate over a future funding system.
67 See Press Release, Dep't of Transp., Sec'y Mineta Announces $59.5 Billion
Budget for FY 2006 to Fund Vital Transp. Projects (Feb. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot2305.htm (stating that the DOT FY 2006 budget
request "includes $14 billion for the Federal Aviation Administration").
68 FAA Chief Counsel Andy Steinberg and DOT General Counsel Jeff Rosen
were particularly helpful in that process.
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In particular, the FAA is seeking involvement by major stake-
holders and hopefully is pursuing a consensual decision-making
approach. There are also indications that the FAA has gained
better knowledge of its costs and therefore may be able to relate
them more closely to the ATC services it provides to aviation
users.
Yet, one is reminded of Ronald Reagan's admonition to
"trust, but verify." In light of the FAA's disastrous experience
with overflight user fees, the aviation community would be wise
to take concrete steps to protect itself from a recurrence of such
a debacle - on a much wider scale.
At a minimum, the industry should strive to obtain the follow-
ing safeguards:
1. The FAA's assurance that any user fees are based on the
FAA's actual costs of providing the services rendered to
the user.
2. A completely transparent cost accounting system at the
FAA.
3. The FAA's making publicly available all documents and
information that form that basis for the FAA's fee
methodology.
4. The provision by the FAA of empirical support for any
assumptions that underlie the fee methodology.
5. The FAA's commitment to timely seek, and give genuine
consideration to, industry comments prior to the agency's
decision on the fee methodology.
6. An extensive and authentic public discourse between the
FAA and aviation industry members in which agency offi-
cials consider, refer and react to the points being made by
the industry representatives.
7. A right of meaningful judicial review of the fee methodol-
ogy used by the FAA and its application to affected
carriers.
By following these measures, both the government and indus-
try will benefit. Air carriers and other users will be secure in the
knowledge that the fees they are paying were subject to extreme
scrutiny in an open and consensual process involving all stake-
holders. And as a result, the FAA may well be able to establish a
reliable, cost-based revenue stream free of the uncertainty and
disruption of serious litigation. In other words, the very availa-
bility of unfettered judicial review may make its use unnecessary.
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Given the enormity of what is at stake, such an outcome will not
come easily, but it is certainly to be hoped for.
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